The Pentagon’s False Narrative About UAP And US Nuclear Warfare Assets
Scientific studies and the historical record of foreign technologies negate the Pentagon’s narratives about UAP interest in US atomic warfare assets.
Please note that the following column appeared in the April 7, 2024 digital edition of
the Roswell Daily Record and is republished with permission.
By Kevin Wright
Those who have studied unidentified anomalous phenomena (UAP) over several decades, like Dr. Jacques Vallée, historian Richard Dolan, and many others, have come to differing conclusions about the nature, origin, and or meaning of UAP. One prevalent conclusion, however, is that the phenomena are tricksters.
The same attribution could be given to the Department of Defense (DoD), the Intelligence Community, and others involved in keeping secret what elements of the government know about the UAP enigma.
In my column with the Roswell Daily Record last week, I asked what the Pentagon is hiding from the American public about what it knows or doesn’t know about UAP, particularly the relationship between UAP and US nuclear and military assets.
The recent report by the DoD’s All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office (AARO) on the “Historical Record of US Government Involvement” with UAP barely mentions incidents involving UAP and atomic warfare assets despite putatively covering eight decades of reported UAP activity. Indeed, the white paper ignores hundreds of documented accounts of such incidents.
Neither AARO’s findings nor Dr. Sean Kirkpatrick, the former Director of the AARO, indicated anything beyond actions of a foreign adversary or inadvertent/unauthorized disclosures of legitimate US programs that have nothing to do with UAP. Of course, there were also the usual explanations of atmospheric weather anomalies, balloons, and swamp gas.
None of this adds up.
Recent groundbreaking research by members of the Scientific Coalition for UAP Studies (SCU), an organization I advise on public relations, offers fascinating insights into UAP activities intertwined with US nuclear warfare assets.
The SCU’s thorough examinations of UAP activities in the post-World War II era, spanning from 1945 to 1975, revealed a convincing narrative intricately linked with the development and deployment of US atomic warfare capabilities.
The initial investigation, the UAP Pattern Recognition Study, uncovered a significant connection between reported bursts of UAP activity and critical milestones in nuclear weapons technology advancement. Spikes in UAP presence notably coincided with activities at sites involved in atomic weaponry development, including missile complexes and initiatives for warhead deployment.
Going deeper into the motives behind these UAP incidents, the second inquiry, the UAP Indications Analysis, identified a distinct pattern wherein UAP activities evolved in tandem with advancements in nuclear warfare capabilities. Notably, as weapons delivery systems advanced, the intensity and nature of UAP encounters also progressed, suggesting systematic scrutiny of America’s atomic warfare infrastructure.
The most recent comprehensive examination, the UAP Activity Pattern Study, released last week, unveiled a nuanced shift in UAP behavior, transitioning from prominent daytime sightings to nighttime close encounters, particularly with civilian observers. Additionally, the study highlights a significant rise in UAP loitering, especially during the late 1960s, indicating a shift from military to public spheres.
Furthermore, disc-shaped UAP were observed executing extraordinary maneuvers, including instantaneous vertical acceleration, speeds surpassing 9,000 miles per hour, and 90-degree turns without altering their speed, emphasizing the complexity and sophistication of these phenomena.
In other words, UAP exhibited mind-boggling capabilities and initially focused on the atomic development complex: radioactive materials production and shipment, weapons design, and stockpiling. Then, curiously, the concentrated focus on these assets never repeated after the development period. Instead, the activity and apparent surveillance followed the deployment of strategic weapons, major Strategic Air Command bomber bases, and new Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) bases, many of which were extensions of the bomber facilities.
After the first-generation ICBMs were replaced, UAP surveillance of the sites that housed them did not continue; only the sites that received the newest types of missiles received attention. That pattern continued until the end of SCU’s study period.
These peer-reviewed studies, meticulously curated from official reports and government data, offer unprecedented insights into the intersection of UAP phenomena and atomic warfare assets in the post-World War II era, revealing significant discrepancies with the Pentagon’s prevailing explanations, e.g., that UAP results from the actions of foreign adversaries. Notably, the timelines of technological advancements by prominent geopolitical players such as China, the former Soviet Union, North Korea, and Iran cast doubt on any theory that UAP is tethered to foreign countries, emphasizing the complexity and uncertainty surrounding the origins of UAP.
Suppose Russia, China, and others failed to reach atomic warfare capabilities from a technological standpoint, at least until after the initial phase of UAP surveillance. Is it plausible that these foreign adversaries were technologically advanced enough to observe highly sensitive national security assets half a world away before their nuclear technology maturity with impunity?
China’s maiden nuclear weapon test occurred in October 1964, which postdates numerous earlier UAP incidents. Similarly, the Soviet Union’s initial atomic bomb test happened in 1949, following the emergence of UAP reports.
China’s inaugural ICBM test transpired in 1971, nearly 30 years after documented UAP events began. The Soviet Union, a significant global player, only launched its first genuine ICBM in 1957. For later context, it is also important to note that the US did not successfully test its first true ICBM until 1958.
North Korea’s technological strides, evidenced by its first satellite launch in 1998 and its debut nuclear weapon test in 2006, took place long after the scrutinized period ended.
Iran, a recent entrant into the geopolitical sphere, achieved its first domestically-produced satellite launch in February 2009.
These incongruences raise serious questions about the veracity of the foreign adversaries hypothesis in explaining the origins of UAP, particularly in the early decades of the Atomic Age, beginning in the mid-1940s. So, what are we left with if we eliminate the foreign adversary hypothesis and discount the likelihood that the US had such top-secret, black-budget advanced aerospace technologies surveilling its own atomic warfare assets in the 1940s and 1950s?
Again, there is no way the DoD hasn’t done its due diligence on unidentified craft intruding on atomic warfare assets, whether or not the government agencies charged with national security want to admit to it. The question remains: what is the Pentagon not telling the American public?