Danny Sheehan Responds to the Kona Blue Document

View Danny’s response to the recently released Kona Blue DocView the Kona Blue document below.

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Document Overview

AARO DHS Kona Blue
February 5, 2024

The Honorable Kathleen H. Hicks
Deputy Secretary of Defense
1010 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1010

Dear Dr. Hicks:

Thank you for your letter on September 28, 2023.

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) agrees to provide the Department of Defense (DoD) with documents and relevant information associated with KONA BLUE. KONA BLUE was a DHS prospective special access program (PSAP) terminated on February 10, 2012. The following actions were taken:

• All DHS documents associated with the KONA BLUE PSAP are declassified and approved for public release.
• The strike-out method was utilized to retain visibility of prior classifications and redactions were made based on policy and legal review.
• All pertinent DHS records have been searched and no additional information associated with the KONA BLUE PSAP has been discovered.

I appreciate your continued cooperation and support for DHS. Should you wish to discuss this matter further, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Sincerely,
Kristie Canegallo
Acting Deputy Secretary

Undue Attention by Government or Private Sector Entities:

• Undue attention by government or private sector entities, not involved in AATIP, may directly or indirectly interfere with the daily AATIP mission and potentially threaten the overall success of the program.

Allocation of Personnel, Support, and Oversight:

• The highly specialized nature of the personnel involved in AATIP means overt acknowledgment of their participation could lead to security and counterintelligence risks.
• Occasional assistance from specialized individuals within DoD, the scientific community, or academia may be necessary. Protecting their identities and affiliations is crucial to avoid unnecessary scrutiny.
• Without appropriate Restricted SAP protection, the cost of a compromise would be significantly higher than that associated with a properly administered Restricted SAP.
• Protecting industry partnerships and participation is critical, as public awareness of an industry's affiliation with AATIP may discourage further participation with the U.S. Government.

Application and Engineering:

• The nuanced manner in which some technologies will be collected, engineered, and applied by the U.S. may require senior-level government approval. These decision-makers must be given the necessary time to make strategic decisions, with access to the "big picture" or overall intent of the program restricted to those on a strict Bigoted List.
• The associated exotic technologies likely involve extremely sophisticated concepts within quantum mechanics, nuclear science, electromagnetic theory, gravity, and thermodynamics. Given their potential for catastrophic effects if used by adversaries, an unusually high degree of operational security and read-on discretion is required.

Due to the expertise required to carry out the program's objectives, a small, specialized group of DoD personnel is needed to perform the SAP-related functions and execute programmatic requirements. It is essential that Government and military personnel already involved with this program be assigned to further support it in a Restricted SAP capacity. These individuals currently possess the appropriate security clearances and are already providing unique support to AATIP.