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Historical Case Studies of U.S. Government Disinformation: COINTELPRO (1956–1971)

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Document|UFO/UAP and the US Government|The Disinformation Series
byKevin Wright
onMay 19, 2025
Part of "The Disinformation Series," this section explores COINTELPRO as a case study in domestic disinformation and narrative control. Through surveillance, media manipulation, and the targeting of dissent, the FBI operationalized techniques that would later shape the suppression of UAP-related research and public accountability.

COINTELPRO, short for Counter-Intelligence Program, was a series of covert FBI operations initiated in 1956 under Director J. Edgar Hoover, aimed at surveilling, infiltrating, and disrupting domestic political organizations perceived by Hoover and his ideological allies as threats to national security. Although initially justified by its founders as a counter-subversion measure during the Cold War, COINTELPRO’s operational scope quickly expanded to target civil rights organizations, anti-war groups, black/red/brown liberation movements, and political dissidents. The program’s tactics included illegal surveillance, psychological warfare, harassment, the fabrication of evidence, blackmail, and the manipulation of media narratives to discredit and neutralize perceived adversaries.50

Key targets of COINTELPRO included figures such as Martin Luther King Jr., other members of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), the Black Panther Party, and anti-Vietnam War activists. FBI agents employed forged letters, anonymous threats, and false media leaks to sow distrust within organizations, create internal divisions, and undermine public support for activist leaders. Notably, the FBI sent King a note urging him to commit suicide, threatening to expose wiretap recordings of FBI-staged “honey pot” sexual encounters. Similar efforts targeted Black Panther Party leaders, where false accusations and planted evidence aimed to incite violence and justify state repression.

The existence of COINTELPRO was revealed in 1971 when activists broke into an FBI field office in Media, Pennsylvania, exposing internal documents that detailed the program’s operations. Public reaction to the disclosures was overwhelmingly critical, leading to congressional investigations by the Church Committee and reforms intended to limit intelligence agency abuses. Nevertheless, the FBI understated the scope of wrongdoing, framing COINTELPRO as an overzealous but ultimately defensive measure rather than a systemic violation of constitutional rights.

The COINTELPRO model relied heavily on disinformation as a primary operational tool. Fabricated communications were used to fracture social movements, infiltrators were deployed to provoke internal conflict, and media channels were exploited to frame activists as dangerous extremists. These actions were not reactive but part of a proactive strategy to manage public narratives and suppress grassroots challenges to the status quo.

COINTELPRO’s relevance to managing UAP and NHI-related research lies in its demonstration of how intelligence agencies operationalize disinformation to marginalize inconvenient knowledge51. Just as political dissenters were stigmatized and discredited, credible UAP witnesses, scientists, and whistleblowers have often been subjected to ridicule, reputational damage, or institutional isolation52. Both phenomena exhibit a formula: identify the disruptive source, undermine its credibility, flood the public space with dismissive narratives, and secure institutional deniability once exposure occurs.

50 U.S. Senate. Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. Final Report, Book III: Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans. 94th Cong., 2d sess., April 26, 1976.

51 “In these programs, the Bureau went beyond the collection of intelligence to secret action designed to ‘disrupt’ and ‘neutralize’ target groups and individuals.” U.S. Senate. Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. Final Report, Book III: Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans. 94th Cong., 2d sess., April 26, 1976.

52 Ryan Graves: “The stigma attached to UAP is real and powerful and challenges national security. It silences commercial pilots who fear professional repercussions, discourages witnesses, and is only compounded by recent government claims questioning the credibility of eyewitness testimony.” U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Oversight and Accountability. Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena: Implications on National Security, Public Safety, and Government Transparency. 118th Congress, 1st session, July 26, 2023. Testimony of Ryan Graves.